By: Evans Osei-Bonsu
The passage of the Tribunals Bill, 2026 marks a significant attempt to revive Ghana’s tribunal system in line with Articles 125, 126, 142 and 143 of the 1992 Constitution. According to the Memorandum accompanying the Bill, its primary objective is to establish a constitutional framework for tribunals that promotes access to justice, expedites the determination of cases and removes the historical stigma associated with tribunals by embedding them firmly within the Judiciary.
These are commendable objectives. Ghana undoubtedly requires an efficient justice delivery system capable of addressing specialised offences such as economic crimes, narcotics, mining offences and crimes against the State. The intention behind the Bill therefore deserves recognition rather than outright condemnation.
However, good intentions alone do not make good legislation.
Given Ghana’s political history and the unfortunate memories associated with public tribunals during previous military regimes, legislation establishing tribunals must be drafted in a manner that completely eliminates every possibility of political manipulation, executive interference and abuse of judicial power.
For this reason, the President should not assent to the Tribunals Bill in its current form. Instead, the Bill ought to be referred back to Parliament for targeted amendments to strengthen its safeguards and ensure that tribunals remain instruments of justice- not instruments of political persecution.
The following provisions deserve urgent reconsideration.
1. Appointment of Tribunal Leadership Creates an Unnecessary Risk of Executive Influence
The independence of every adjudicatory body begins with the independence of those who preside over it.
Clause 11 empowers the President, acting on the advice of the Judicial Council, to appoint the Chairpersons of both Regional and District Tribunals. At the same time, the Chief Justice appoints panel members after consulting the Regional Coordinating Council (RCC) in the case of Regional Tribunals and the District Assembly in the case of District Tribunals.
Although the Judicial Council plays an advisory role, the ultimate appointing authority remains the President.
This becomes problematic where appointments are tied to limited terms that may create expectations of renewal or continued executive favour. Any system that places the career progression or continued tenure of tribunal leadership within the influence of the Executive creates a perception that tribunal chairpersons may consciously or unconsciously seek to satisfy the appointing authority rather than remain completely insulated from political pressure.
Justice must not only be done; it must manifestly be seen to be done.
Even more troubling is Clause 11(2), which requires the Chief Justice to appoint Regional Tribunal panel members in consultation with the Regional Coordinating Council. The RCC is fundamentally an executive and political institution representing the Central Government within the regions. Its involvement in selecting persons who will sit in judgment over citizens unnecessarily injects political considerations into what ought to be an entirely judicial process.
Judicial appointments should never carry even the appearance of political patronage.
If public confidence is to be preserved, the involvement of Regional Coordinating Councils and District Assemblies in tribunal appointments should be removed entirely and replaced with an independent, transparent appointment mechanism solely under the Judicial Council.
2. Clause 22 Risks Making Tribunals the Preferred Courts Over the High Court
One of the most concerning provisions is Clause 22.
The Bill gives Regional Tribunals concurrent jurisdiction with constitutionally established courts and further provides that where both a tribunal and a court possess jurisdiction over a matter, the tribunal may proceed unless the Chief Justice directs otherwise.
Although presented as concurrent jurisdiction, the practical effect is very different.
In reality, this provision risks making tribunals the preferred forum for prosecutions whenever prosecuting authorities decide to commence proceedings there. The High Court may possess identical jurisdiction, yet the tribunal effectively proceeds unless specifically stopped.
This raises an obvious constitutional concern.
Who decides whether a matter should be filed before the High Court or before a tribunal?
If prosecutorial authorities are left with unrestricted discretion, there is a real danger of forum shopping, where politically sensitive prosecutions are deliberately channelled to tribunals rather than ordinary courts.
Tribunals were intended to complement the judicial system—not replace the ordinary courts as courts of first instance.
The current wording creates unnecessary uncertainty and has the potential to undermine public confidence in the traditional court hierarchy.
The Bill should instead provide objective statutory criteria identifying the categories of cases that must be assigned to tribunals while preserving the constitutional role of the High Court.
3. The Omission of the Bail Protection Previously Contained in the Courts Act is a Serious Defect
Clause 18 provides that decisions of the Regional Tribunal shall be determined by the opinion of the majority of members hearing the matter.
Ordinarily, majority decisions are a common feature of collegiate courts.
However, the concern arises because the Bill effectively replaces the existing Regional Tribunal provisions contained in the Courts Act, 1993 (Act 459), yet omits an important safeguard contained in section 26(2) of that Act.
Under section 26(2) of the Courts Act, where the majority of the tribunal convicts an accused person but the Chairman is not part of that majority, the accused person who files an appeal is automatically entitled to bail pending the determination of that appeal.
That safeguard recognised the unique position of the legally trained Chairman and protected accused persons against potentially questionable majority decisions by lay panel members.
The omission of this protection from the new Bill significantly weakens the rights of accused persons.
In politically charged prosecutions, this missing safeguard could expose individuals to immediate incarceration despite the legally qualified Chairman disagreeing with the conviction.
That omission is neither accidental nor insignificant.
It deprives accused persons of an important procedural protection that has existed under Ghanaian law and should therefore be restored before the Bill becomes law.
4. Clause 28 Must Clearly Define the Applicable Rules of Evidence
Clause 28 provides that the Evidence Act, 1975 applies to tribunal proceedings “subject to the necessary modifications.”
The phrase “necessary modifications” introduces unnecessary ambiguity.
Evidence rules exist to guarantee fairness, reliability and consistency in criminal trials.
Whenever legislation permits modifications without clearly specifying the nature and extent of those modifications, uncertainty follows.
Could hearsay rules be relaxed?
Could documentary requirements be altered?
Could standards governing admissibility differ from those applicable in ordinary courts?
The Bill provides no answers.
A criminal justice system cannot operate on implied modifications.
The legislation should specify precisely which evidentiary rules may be modified, under what circumstances, and subject to what safeguards.
Justice demands certainty.
5. Public Interest Cases Should Be Mandatorily Broadcast Live
Clause 30 states that proceedings involving matters of public interest “may” be broadcast live.
The operative word is “may.”
This leaves live broadcasting entirely discretionary.
Yet many tribunal cases will likely involve allegations of corruption, abuse of office, organised crime and offences against the State.
Such cases attract enormous public attention.
Transparency should never depend upon discretion where national interest is involved.
Mandatory live broadcasting of high-profile public interest proceedings would significantly enhance public confidence, discourage allegations of secret trials and reinforce the constitutional principle of open justice.
Exceptions may, of course, exist for matters involving national security, child witnesses or protected identities.
Outside those exceptional situations, openness should be the rule rather than the exception.
6. Clause 54 Grants Broad Immunity Without Corresponding Accountability
Clause 54 grants immunity to Chairpersons and tribunal members from both civil and criminal liability for actions taken in the performance of their duties.
Judicial immunity is an accepted principle intended to protect judicial independence.
However, immunity should never be interpreted as absolute insulation from accountability.
The Bill already requires tribunal members to perform their duties impartially and in accordance with due process.
Clause 54 should therefore expressly state that immunity does not extend to acts done in bad faith, with malice, corruption, gross misconduct or deliberate abuse of office.
Such a qualification would preserve judicial independence while ensuring that immunity cannot become a shield for impunity.
TO SUM IT UP:
The Tribunals Bill, 2026 undoubtedly seeks to modernise Ghana’s tribunal system and improve access to justice. Its objectives are constitutionally legitimate and, in many respects, necessary.
Nevertheless, history teaches that institutions designed to administer justice can become instruments of injustice if adequate safeguards are absent.
The concerns surrounding appointments, concurrent jurisdiction, the removal of an important bail safeguard, ambiguity in evidentiary rules, discretionary transparency and broad judicial immunity are not merely technical drafting issues. They are structural weaknesses that future governments, regardless of political party – could exploit against opponents, critics or ordinary citizens.
This is therefore not a partisan argument against tribunals.
It is a constitutional argument in favour of stronger tribunals.
The President has an opportunity to strengthen public confidence in Ghana’s justice system by referring the Bill back to Parliament for reconsideration of these specific provisions before granting assent.
A tribunal system established with robust safeguards will serve justice for generations.
A tribunal system established with avoidable defects risks reopening painful chapters of Ghana’s constitutional history.
The provident constitutional course is therefore review before assent- not assent before review.
WRITER: Evans Osei-Bonsu
(Broadcast Journalist- Angel Broadcasting Network)
(BA, LL.B, BL Candidate- Ghana School of Law)
